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1 
Article 
Against Permititis: Why Voluntary Organizations 
Should Regulate the Use of Cancer Drugs 
Richard A. Epstein† 
 
INTRODUCTION   
One of the thorniest questions in legal analysis concerns the 
longstanding tension between individual autonomy and social control. The 
principle of autonomy, or individual self-rule, holds a strong grip on eve-
ryone’s imagination by posing the following question: If I am not allowed 
to control my own destiny, just who can? In this context, autonomy func-
tions as the first and most powerful line of defense against the domination 
of one person by another and of all individuals by the state. At the same 
time, the faithful adherence to the principle of individual autonomy could 
be almost too strong, because it precludes the ability of the state to organ-
ize the provision of public goods. Writing in 1965, Mancur Olson, Jr. 
showed how the absence of state intervention could lead to the underprovi-
sion of key public goods such as national defense.1 Three years later, Gar-
rett Hardin showed how the failure to impose social controls could lead to 
the tragedy of the commons, whereby excessive hunting or fishing would 
eventually bring about the premature collapse of wildlife populations.2  
Just as the case for state regulation has become a more powerful tool 
for dealing with public goods and common pool problems, the principle of 
autonomy continues to hold sway with respect to the decisions that indi-
viduals make over their own bodies. This issue is of supreme importance 
in dealing with medical matters, where the autonomy principle offers guid-
ance on the ancient question of whether to accept or reject medical treat-
ments. That principle received perhaps its most famous short formulation 
by Judge Benjamin Cardozo who wrote nearly a century ago:  
Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what 
shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation with-
out his patient’s consent commits an assault, for which he is liable in damages. . . . 
This is true, except in cases of emergency where the patient is unconscious, and 
where it is necessary to operate before consent can be obtained.3  
 
†  James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law, The University of Chi-
cago; the Peter and Kirsten Senior Fellow, The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and 
Peace, Stanford University; Visiting Professor, NYU Law School. I would like to thank Dr. 
Brian Durie of UCLA Medical Center for his helpful explanation of the National Compre-
hensive Cancer Network (NCCN). This paper benefited from comments given at the Ameri-
can Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research Conference on Oncology Drug Develop-
ment in March 2008, and at a work-in-progress session with my colleagues at the University 
of Chicago. My thanks also to Caroline Van Ness, NYU Law School, class of 2011, for her 
research assistance on the paper. Needless to say, all conclusions on the role of the FDA are 
mine alone. Copyright © 2009 by Richard A. Epstein. 
 1. MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 14 (1965).  
 2. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243, 1244, 1248 (1968); 
see also H. Scott Gordon, The Economic Theory of a Common Property Resource: The Fi-
shery, 62 J. POL. ECON. 124, 125–26 (1954).  
 3. Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914), abrogated on 
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Notwithstanding the pervasive concerns of collective action, there is 
little doubt that half of this thesis still holds true today. The defensive use 
of personal autonomy allows individuals to refuse medical treatment that 
others may have concluded, even rightly, would work for their own bene-
fit.4 At the same time, the offensive use of autonomy—namely the right to 
accept treatment with consent—has been widely rejected today, especially 
in connection with the use of drugs. No individual today can demand 
whatever medical treatment he or she wishes to receive. The modern posi-
tion has been put forcefully by George Annas: “Patients in the United 
States have always had a right to refuse any medical treatment, but we 
have never had a right to demand mistreatment, inappropriate treatment, or 
even investigational or experimental interventions.”5 Evidently, the road to 
unrestricted medical usage is blocked by daunting institutional obstacles, 
where most notably the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) must license 
a drug before it may be made available for general sale or use.  
The common justifications for imposing this restriction rest on the as-
sumption that ordinary individuals cannot collect or correctly interpret the 
information that is needed to make intelligent decisions on these matters. 
Therefore, the argument continues, state intervention is necessary to guard 
against the exploitation of incompetent patients by unscrupulous purveyors 
of medical care. Indeed, a close reading of the well-known 1979 Belmont 
Report shows how easy it is to convert an implicit endorsement of the au-
tonomy principle into a strong call for increased government oversight of 
medical treatment.6  
This current uneven acceptance of the autonomy principle manifests 
itself most clearly in the area of drug regulation. The FDA can currently 
keep drugs off the market if it so chooses, thereby limiting the scope of au-
tonomous choices. Once a drug makes it to the marketplace, however, the 
normal principles of individual autonomy apply. Within this context it is 
critical to recall that ordinary individuals do not make their decisions in an 
isolated position, akin to Robinson Crusoe stranded on a desert island.7 Ra-
ther, they consciously rely on voluntarily chosen experts to assist and 
guide them in their choices. In effect, the desirability of autonomous 
choices rests on the belief that competent individuals, supported by advice 
 
other grounds by Bing v. Thunig, 143 N.E.2d 3, 9 (N.Y. 1957), superseded by statute, N.Y. 
PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2805-d (McKinney 2007), as recognized in Retkwa v. Orentreich, 584 
N.Y.S.2d 710 (N.Y.Sup. Ct. 1992). 
 4. See Richard A. Epstein, The Erosion of Individual Autonomy in Medical Decision-
making: Of the FDA and IRBs, 96 GEO. L.J. 559, 566–80 (2008) [hereinafter Epstein, Ero-
sion of Autonomy]. 
 5. George J. Annas, Cancer and the Constitution—Choice at Life’s End, 357 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 408, 410 (2007).  
 6. See NAT’L COMM’N FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL 
AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES FOR THE PROTEC-
TION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF RESEARCH 4–5 (1978). See also Larry R. Churchill, Toward 
a More Robust Autonomy: Revising the Belmont Report, in BELMONT REVISITED 111, 111 
(James F. Childress, Eric M. Meslin & Harold T. Shapiro eds., 2005) (criticizing the Bel-
mont Report’s “weak and distorted understanding of self-determination.”); Richard A. Eps-
tein, Defanging IRBs: Replacing Coercion with Information, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 735, 741–
45 (2007) [hereinafter Epstein, Defanging IRBs] (discussing the Belmont Report’s concep-
tual errors). For a more critical view on the licensing of research performed on human sub-
jects, see Philip Hamburger, Getting Permission, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 405, 406–10 (2007). 
 7. See DANIEL DEFOE, ROBINSON CRUSOE (Thomas Keymer ed., Oxford 2007) 234, 
302 (1719). The original Robinson Crusoe was said to have spent twenty-seven years in iso-
lation on a tropical island located somewhere in the Caribbean. 
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from families, friends, and professionals, can, on average, make better de-
cisions about their own health care than any government agency that seeks 
to protect them from their own mistakes.  
The central challenge in modern drug regulation is to explain why the 
FDA should be maintained as a public gatekeeper, instead of being rele-
gated to the more modest role in which it merely certifies various products 
as “safe and effective.” In the latter role, the FDA would not have a mono-
poly position but would rather act as one of many certification agencies 
that offer advice on what drugs to use and what drugs to avoid. Indeed, it is 
just this position that I wish to defend. My thesis is that we should remove, 
or at least sharply curtail, FDA control of the licensing of new drugs. This 
thesis will sound harsh to individuals who instinctively accept the proposi-
tion that the government’s police power gives it the unquestioned right to 
regulate for the health and safety of the population.8  
To demonstrate this thesis, my analysis concentrates largely on that 
part of the medical thicket where the case for FDA oversight is normally 
thought to be at its zenith: the use of cancer drugs which are fraught with 
evident side effects, many of which can prove fatal. In dealing with this 
issue, I freely admit that I have no expertise on any matters that deal with 
the relative merits of the various therapies that are, or may be, used to at-
tack cancer. Those tasks should be left to patients in conjunction with their 
own doctors, often on the strength of knowledge acquired from nongo-
vernment sources. I do, however, think that a lawyer has something to con-
tribute to understanding the institutional arrangements that are likely to 
lead to responsible individual decisions. In making this case, I start from 
the classical liberal presumption that government intervention must be re-
garded as a bad until it is shown to be a good.9  
That presumption rests on two grounds, both fully applicable to the 
FDA. First, intervention requires administrative expenditures by the state 
and imposes compliance costs on the parties. The imposition of these so-
cial costs can be justified only by pointing to some collateral gain in the 
quality and safety of medical decisions. Second, the incentives of self-
interested individuals, acting in political settings, do not benefit from the 
“invisible hand” presumption that dates back to Adam Smith.10 There is no 
 
 8. Indeed, the Supreme Court has recognized the government’s sweeping power to 
protect the population’s health: 
Nothing in the history of the 1938 Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, which first es-
tablished procedures for review of drug safety, or of the 1962 Amendments, which 
added the current safety and effectiveness standards in § 201(p)(1), suggests that 
Congress intended protection only for persons suffering from curable diseases. . . . 
Both Reports note with approval the FDA’s policy of considering effectiveness 
when passing on the safety of drugs prescribed for “life-threatening disease.” 
United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 552–53 (1979) (footnotes omitted). 
 9. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Active Liberty: A Progressive Alternative to Tex-
tualism and Originalism?, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2391 (2006) (reviewing STEPHEN 
BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY (2005) (“The classical liberal tradition emphasizes limited gov-
ernment, checks and balances, and strong protection of individual rights.”). 
 10. Adam Smith explains the “invisible hand” presumption as follows: 
[E]very individual necessarily labours to render the annual revenue of the society 
as great as he can. He generally, indeed, neither intends to promote the public in-
terest, nor knows how much he is promoting it. By preferring the support of do-
mestic to that of foreign industry, he intends only his own security; and by direct-
ing that industry in such a manner as its produce may be of the greatest value, he 
intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invis-
ible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention. Nor is it always 
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necessary alignment between public welfare and the exercise of public 
power, such as exists in competitive markets. The invisible hand analogy is 
equally inapplicable to administrative agencies, which operate on their 
own internal imperatives. In many cases, the public interest might require 
that drugs be released on the market. Yet an agency concerned with criti-
cism and public scrutiny will not do so, knowing that it is harder to hold it 
responsible for the death and pain that it did not prevent than for the death 
and pain that it caused. To make the point in quasi-medical terms, I have 
coined the term permititis—the ability of government agencies to block 
voluntary personal decisions—which should be presumptively regarded as 
a danger to be avoided rather than as a progressive development worthy of 
social support backed by public funds.  
Sound social policy places a heavy burden on any government exer-
cise of its permit power that has such a stark impact on the lives of ordi-
nary citizens, without their consent, and often over their protest. Even 
though FDA regulations are nominally directed at pharmaceutical compa-
nies, their effects are necessarily felt by the individuals who are prevented 
from purchasing their products. In imposing its will, the State wrongly 
substitutes its judgment for that of individuals. Sick people should be able 
to decide as a matter of right whether to assume the manifest risks of cer-
tain treatments in the hopes of receiving some greater gain.  
To justify its assertion of power, the State must show, at a minimum, 
that the decisions it makes for other people are better than the decisions 
that they would otherwise make for themselves. Indeed, the level of im-
provement should be great enough to offset their loss of personal liberty—
an intangible but critical value—above and beyond the administrative costs 
of the system. That burden is frequently met when the government seeks to 
control activities that may harm others, as with pollution and contagion.11 
The FDA, however, does not guard against harm to strangers, but only 
against potential harms that individuals may or may not inflict upon them-
selves. In this context, the threshold for government intervention should be 
even higher.  
Any evaluation of the FDA’s performance in permitting drugs and 
devices must examine the sources of error in both public and private deci-
sionmaking. This comparison cannot be properly made if it only contrasts 
the knowledge of government agents with that of individual patients, even 
when acting under the advice of a physician. The key to any global as-
sessment on relative institutional competence also depends on whether var-
ious private voluntary organizations—both for-profit and non-profit—
serve as effective intermediaries for collecting and organizing information 
in ways that improve the caliber of patient treatment decisions. These in-
 
the worse for the society that it was no part of it. By pursuing his own interest he 
frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than when he really in-
tends to promote it. I have never known much good done by those who affected to 
trade for the public good. 
ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 
423 (Edwin Cannan ed., Random House, Inc. 1937) (1776).  
 11. See LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT 
16–17 (2008) (discussing broadly the regulation of harmful activities); Mark Hall, The Scope 
and Limits of Public Health Law, 46 PERSP. BIOL. & MED. S199, S204–05 (Supp. 2003) 
(discussing the critical role of regulating pollution and contagion specifically). For a rejoind-
er to Gostin, see Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the “Old” Public Health: The Legal 
Framework for the Regulation of Public Health, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1421, 1425–28 (2004). 
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termediate organizations should not be dismissed as some social will-of-
the-wisp, for they occupy a distinctive and powerful niche in virtually all 
areas of social life. Generally, autonomous individuals do not crave per-
sonal isolation; rather, they wish to control their own destiny in coopera-
tion with others.12 Getting the right forms of organization is not easy if 
their only interactions take place on a one-on-one basis, where the social 
landscape becomes even more dense. Trade and social associations often 
act as critical liaisons between the individual and the State, either by ag-
gregating preferences to affect political decisions or by collecting informa-
tion for their members.13 This pooling of resources generates more reliable 
information at a lower cost and helps to overcome coordination problems 
without the need for government coercion.14 That information is, of course, 
not perfect, which is one reason why a multiplicity of sources allows for 
each organization to impose its checks on the other.  
Indeed, these types of intermediaries are commonplace for all serious 
diseases, serving as a clearinghouse for medical information.15 Many are 
managed by families of individuals who have suffered or died from serious 
diseases.16 Others are run commercially17 or by professional medical socie-
ties.18 Given the ubiquitous, long-term presence of these private institu-
tions or patient groups, the critical question is whether a rigid state permit 
and certification system can outperform them where there exists an incen-
tive to speed up delivery of accurate information about cancer therapies to 
their patients. I do not think that this burden can be met. The critique here 
 
 12. Cf. Epstein, Erosion of Autonomy, supra note 4, at 564 (arguing that an autonom-
ous individual is properly defined as one who has an awareness of how his or her actions 
affect others).  
 13. See ROBERT D. REID & DAVID C. BOJANIC, HOSPITALITY MARKETING MANAGE-
MENT 214 (4th ed. 2006) (“[T]rade associations collect information from their members and 
then provide industry averages that can be used to measure a firm’s relative importance.”). 
 14. Cf. Arnold J. Rosoff, Consumer-Driven Health Care: Questions, Cautions, and an 
Inconvenient Truth, 28 J. LEGAL MED. 11, 24–25 (2007) (suggesting that as consumers be-
come more involved in the healthcare marketplace “there will be increasing pressure on pro-
viders to make information available” and “mechanisms of various sorts, governmental and 
private, will evolve to assure that information is reliable and up to date”). 
 15. See, e.g., American Cancer Society, Treatment Decision Tools, http:// 
www.cancer.org/docroot/ETO/eto_1_1a.asp?from=fast/ (last visited Sept. 15, 2009) (provid-
ing extensive information about various cancers and available treatments). 
 16. See, e.g., ALS Worldwide, http://www.alsworldwide.org/ (last visited Sept. 10, 
2009) (noting that ALS Worldwide, which deals with amyotrophic lateral sclerosis, or Lou 
Gehrig’s disease, was created by Stephen and Barbara Byer after losing their son to ALS). 
 17. See Amy P. Abernethy et al., Systematic Review: Reliability of Compendia Me-
thods for Off-Label Oncology Indications, 150 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 336, 336–37 
(2009) (listing the following compendia of cancer treatment information: American Hospital 
Formulary Service Drug Information, United States Pharmacopeia Drug Information for the 
Health Professional (now known as “DrugPoints”), DRUGDEX Information System, Drug 
Facts and Comparisons, NCCN, and Clinical Pharmacology). The databases Abernethy lists 
are available only for commercial subscribers. 
 18. One example, the Consortium for Citizens With Disabilities, serves as a clearing-
house of information on a range of health care topics, and is comprised of nearly one hun-
dred member organizations who operate together to advocate for national public policy 
measures. See Consortium for Citizens With Disabilities, http://www.c-c-d.org (last visited 
Sept. 10, 2009). Another, the International Lyme and Associated Diseases Society, provides 
a forum for medical professionals dedicated to the proper diagnosis and treatment of Lyme 
and its associated diseases through reviewing clinical research programs and providing ma-
terial, advice, and education for physicians and healthcare providers. See International Lyme 
and Associated Diseases Society, at 
http://www.ilads.org (last visited Sept. 10, 2009). 
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is not directed toward the performance of individual officials and scientists 
inside the FDA, but rather to the basic structure that defines its institutional 
role as a comprehensive regulator. No grant of monopoly power is justified 
if private groups are able to provide better information to potential end us-
ers at lower costs than the state. 
To make this case I proceed in several steps. Part I deals with how to 
analyze the two types of errors that arise in any context that requires deci-
sionmaking under conditions of uncertainty. In so doing, it first identifies 
the costs that should be minimized and then argues that in any rational 
choice environment those costs should be the sum of errors from over- and 
undertreatment, without regard to whether the harm in question is caused 
by a therapeutic agent or a natural cause. Part II uses the same imperfect 
cost/benefit techniques to argue that any error analysis will require that all 
persons, whether as regulators, physicians, or patients obtain reliable in-
formation to minimize the costs of error. Part III examines the relative case 
for coercive and private action. It concludes that state coercion is necessary 
for dealing with adulteration and counterfeiting but has little useful role in 
cancer cases, where information processing can be done more efficiently 
by a wide range of private parties. Part IV examines the underlying pattern 
of centralized control within the FDA and concludes that this kind of con-
trol works no better in medicine than anywhere else. Part V finishes with 
an examination of two major difficulties of the FDA’s centralized 
processes, namely its inability to continuously update its decisions and its 
vulnerability with respect to political and economic influences. A brief 
conclusion follows. Conspicuously missing from this outline is the role of 
tort liability under either product liability or medical malpractice. The 
complications from these claims are legion, but one fact that defines the 
field is this: the precarious position of all serious cancer patients is such 
that the damages from tort liability are so small that pursuit of these reme-
dies is a rarity. The regulatory system dominates the field.  
I.  CAUSATION AND COST/BENEFIT ANALYSIS   
Any analysis of FDA procedures for evaluating drug usage must take 
into account the two forms of error associated with all decisions under 
conditions of uncertainty. Type I error, or a false positive, arises when the 
FDA approves a drug that causes net harm.19 Type II error, or a false nega-
tive, arises from the regulatory decision to keep drugs off the market that 
have a positive expected value in use for at least some identifiable set of 
patients.20 The key point here is that FDA regulation does not occur in a 
vacuum. Where it keeps a drug off the market, it precludes any individua-
lized cost/benefit analysis that patients and physicians can make as to 
whether to use drugs already approved for use. Where it lets a drug onto 
the market, this second filter still remains in place.  
In working through these calculations at either stage, both the FDA 
and individual patients must avoid drawing a philosophical, moral, or func-
tional distinctions between any harm caused by the treatment and any 
caused by the disease. It is often difficult to ignore that distinction in this 
 
 19. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, OVERDOSE: HOW EXCESSIVE GOVERNMENT REGULA-
TION STIFLES PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION 116–18 (2006) [hereinafter EPSTEIN, OVER-
DOSE]. 
 20. See id. 
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context because it is often so relevant in other identifiable legal contexts.21 
More specifically, the early tort law governing liability in personal injury 
cases concentrated on situations where one person’s actions caused harm 
to a stranger, either intentionally or by inadvertence.22 Hitting other indi-
viduals or creating dangerous latent conditions are the paradigmatic illu-
strations of these cases.23 For example, it matters whether a boulder that 
landed on a plaintiff was set in motion by natural forces or by the actions 
of a human being. Why? Because generally the positive law does not im-
pose any individual duty on one person to guard against natural misfor-
tunes that befall another.24 It does, however, hold any individual responsi-
ble for damages inflicted on a stranger when the defendant’s conduct is not 
beneficial.25 
It should be noted, however, that the liability scheme in the stranger 
case is wholly inapplicable in medical treatment settings since the parties 
are not strangers but rather persons joined together in some special rela-
tionship. One potent reason to encourage the deliberate infliction of harm 
is the expectation that an aggressive response to medical threats will cause 
less harm than the treatment eliminates, which is why cancer patients tole-
rate drugs known to have dreadful side effects.26 The parties’ voluntary in-
teractions in making health care decisions logically rests on their expecta-
tion of mutual benefit. To isolate the planned harms for rebuke without 
offsetting their associated benefits is to deny the rationality of the whole 
decision-making process. People undergo a course of treatment not to mi-
nimize the risk of a Type I error, where they could be killed or harmed by 
drug therapy, but rather in an attempt to minimize the sum of errors in both 
directions, no matter whether caused by natural events or by human inter-
vention. They do so because they will only be able to reach their highest 
levels of personal happiness if they take both kinds of errors into account. 
To stress one kind of error to the exclusion of the other leads to needless 
sacrifices of personal satisfaction.  
The failure to identify the proper goal of medical decisionmaking has 
led to serious distortions in health care policy generally. One central pre-
cept of medical ethics relates to the sovereign power that each individual 
has to refuse various forms of medical treatment.27 No physician or gov-
ernment can force any competent individual, however foolish, to accept 
treatment against her will.28 This notion is based on a social understanding 
 
 21. See Richard A. Epstein, Medical Malpractice: The Case for Contract, 1 AM. B. 
FOUND. RES. J. 87, 94–110, 122, 130 (1976); Richard A. Epstein, The Path to The T.J. Hoo-
per: Of Custom and Due Care, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4–5, 19–20 (1992). The distinction is 
found in many, but by no means all, cases. See, e.g., Holland v. Pitocchelli, 13 N.E.2d 390, 
390–91 (Mass. 1938) (noting the distinction); Farwell v. Boston & Worcester R.R. Corp., 45 
Mass. (1 Met.) 49, 60–61 (1842) (illustrating the distinction’s historical use); Pfaffenbach v. 
White Plains Express Corp., 216 N.E.2d 324, 325–26 (N.Y. 1966) (Burke, J., concurring) 
(applying the distinction). 
 22. See generally Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 
151 (1973) (discussing the various causal paradigms in stranger cases). 
 23. See id.  
 24. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 315 (1965); Francis H. Bohlen, The Moral 
Duty to Aid Others as a Basis of Tort Liability, 56 U. PA. L. REV. 217, 218–20 (1908). 
 25. See Bohlen, supra note 24, at 219. 
 26. See ABELOFF’S CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 459–81 (Martin D. Abeloff et al. eds, 4th ed. 
2008) (listing side effects of various chemotherapeutic cancer drugs). 
 27. See Epstein, Erosion of Autonomy, supra note 4, at 569. 
 28. See Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., supra at note 3 
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that no individual should be required to take the risk, or suffer the harm, 
associated with the administration of medical treatment. Decisions to 
refuse treatment are personal. Individuals may, and usually do, seek advice 
from others before making their choices, but the final decision is theirs. 
The willingness to allow stupid decisions does not stem from the desire to 
expand human suffering, but from more salient considerations. Individuals 
have better knowledge of their own subjective preferences, which is why 
the modern law inclines strongly to imposing a duty to disclose on physi-
cians so that patients can link their subjective preferences to reliable in-
formation about the consequences of various alternatives.29 In addition, 
people will devote more attention to making the correct health care deci-
sions when they cannot be second-guessed. After all, investments in in-
formation only yield a positive return to the extent that they are the basis of 
individual action. If people were certain that others would override their 
individual choices, any effort to get better information would be a pure 
waste that yielded no positive return. At that point no one would make 
even the simplest inquiry. By extension, the greater the likelihood that the 
State will override choice, the less people will invest in making responsible 
choices. The State should, of course, provide some protection against 
fraud, but in most cases the best way to do this is through lawsuits against 
the supplier of fraudulent information.30 A decrease in permits issued by 
the FDA is a classic instance of regulatory overkill.  
In modern health care settings, our understanding of personal auton-
omy is altered when the question turns to the right of any individual to ac-
cept medical treatment that could cause harm, alleviate suffering, or both. 
While the language of autonomous choice is often invoked in this discus-
sion, the subtext is noticeably different. Commonly, proponents of FDA 
oversight argue that an agency or board should protect autonomous indi-
viduals of limited ability from making their own choices, lest they make 
too many mistakes. The legal approach slides imperceptibly but inexorably 
from self-determination to paternalism.31 
Within this framework, therefore, the principle of patient autonomy 
accords equal weight to the right to receive drug treatment and the right to 
refuse it. To raise the ante for drug approval on the grounds that it is 
“worse” to kill than to let die goes against the basic effort to maximize the 
personal gains from the receipt of health care.32 The individual patient tries 
to minimize the sum of the two kinds of error and will adopt any strategy 
where the expected outcomes yield a gain that is greater than the cost of 
treatment. It is critical to note, however, that FDA incentives are not 
aligned with a patient’s expected value calculations. All agencies are sub-
 
 29. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 790 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (“[T]he very pur-
pose of the disclosure rule is to protect the patient against consequences which, if known, he 
would have avoided by foregoing the treatment.”). For a discussion of the cross-currents be-
tween objective and subjective choices, see Peter H. Schuck, Rethinking Informed Consent, 
103 YALE L.J. 899, 956–59 (1994). 
 30. See, e.g., Alex Berenson, 33 States to Get $62 Million in Zyprexa Case Settlement, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2008, at B7 (reporting that state-initiated lawsuits against drug company 
Eli Lilly for improperly marketing the antipsychotic medication Zyprexa netted the largest 
consumer protection settlement in history).  
 31. See, e.g., United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 552–53 (1979) (holding that 
Congress passed the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act and the 1962 Amendments to the Act in 
part to shield and protect terminally ill patients).  
 32. See EPSTEIN, OVERDOSE, supra note 19, at 116–18. 
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ject to political pressures which occur when decisions cause traceable, vis-
ible harms.33 The harms that are caused by particular therapeutic agents—
such as thalidomide, which causes major limb deformities34—attract im-
mense political pressures to ban these dangerous products from the mar-
ketplace.35 Overall, the result is a strong bias to overweigh Type I error 
relative to the quiet harms that arise when individuals die for want of the-
rapeutic agents that languish unapproved within the FDA.  
It is for this reason that many, but by no means all, patient groups 
tend to be more vocal than the FDA about allowing new therapies on the 
market.36 Additionally, appeals by families to allow experimental uses of 
drugs that lack FDA approvals are also common.37 In these cases, the FDA 
is reluctant to allow deviation from its norms because it may undermine 
the usefulness of clinical trials.38 Clinical trials, however, are often too lit-
tle or too late for ailing individuals.39 Most patients do not ask whether a 
new treatment meets some abstract standard of statistical significance, 
which says that there is a ninety-five percent chance of some positive re-
sult. They do not have that luxury. Rather, they want to know whether the 
new drug gives them a chance, however small, to improve their status quo.  
Some measure of how this works is the sad story of Abigail Bur-
roughs, who died of squamous cell carcinoma at age twenty-one. At this 
point the story runs as follows: 
Not long after her diagnosis, the Burroughs family learned of an in-
vestigational cancer drug, Erbitux®, that showed good response in early 
trials. Abigail’s prominent oncologist at Johns Hopkins Hospital believed 
the drug had a significant chance of saving her life. But every effort on the 
part of her family, physician, and supporters to procure the drug for Ab-
igail failed. She was ineligible for a clinical trial and the drug company 
couldn’t provide her with Erbitux® for compassionate use. The FDA was 
 
 33. See Brief for John E. Calfee et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 5, 
Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009) (No. 06-1249) (explaining that the FDA knows it 
faces more heat when it commits the visible Type I error of letting bad drugs on the market 
than the invisible Type II error of keeping good drugs off the market). As a matter of social 
utility, the two errors are of equal magnitude. See EPSTEIN, OVERDOSE, supra note 19, at 
116–18. 
 34. See HARVEY TEFF & COLIN MUNRO, THALIDOMIDE: THE LEGAL AFTERMATH 4–6 
(1976). 
 35. See id. at 122 (documenting President John F. Kennedy’s call for increased regula-
tion of drugs in his 1962 State of the Union address in response to thalidomide’s dangerous 
side effects).  
 36. See, e.g., The International Myeloma Foundation, the MDS Foundation and a Coa-
lition of Patient Advocacy Organizations Call for Updated Rules for Reimbursement, Access 
and Approvals for New and Existing Cancer Treatments, 
http://myeloma.org/main.jsp?type=article&id=2651 (outlining a “Statement of Principles” 
issued on behalf of patients and caregivers demanding that policies for early approval of new 
cancer treatments be “reformed and streamlined” and that “an efficient and effective me-
chanism” be created to allow patients to access experimental treatments).  
 37. See, e.g., Amy Harmon, Fighting for a Last Chance at Life, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 
2009, § 1, at 1 (documenting the struggles of one family’s appeal to the FDA for the experi-
mental use of an unapproved drug). 
 38. See id. (“The F.D.A. itself does not want patients to bypass clinical trials, which 
require that some patients receive a placebo to determine reliably whether a drug works.”).  
 39. See Alexander Kamb et al., Why Is Cancer Drug Discovery So Difficult?, 6 NA-
TURE REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 115, 115 (2007) (“Oncology has one of the poorest records 
for investigational drugs in clinical development, with success rates that are more than three 
times lower than for cardiovascular diseases.”).  
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unmoved by her life-and-death situation.40 Abigail died on June 9, 2001.41 
On February 12, 2004, the FDA approved Erbitux® “to treat patients with 
advanced colorectal cancer that has spread to other parts of the body.”42 
After her death, Abigail’s father, Frank Burroughs, founded the Ab-
igail Alliance, which promptly initiated a major litigation effort to insist 
that the autonomy interests of individual patients give them a constitutional 
right to take, with or without FDA approval, any drug that has passed 
Stage I clinical trials.43 Their proposal met an initial round of success by a 
three judge panel in Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental 
Drugs v. von Eschenbach, but was ultimately and decisively quashed when 
the case was reheard en banc.44 The court en banc held that FDA authority 
over health matters is wholly consistent with American constitutional tra-
ditions under which “the democratic branches are better suited to decide 
the proper balance between the uncertain risks and benefits of medical 
technology, and are entitled to deference in doing so.”45  
Why this deference to democratic institutions? The case does not in-
volve the provision of any standard type of public good, and the argument 
is phrased with such generality that it would justify political institutions 
forcing technology on unwilling individuals. Moreover, it would surely re-
quire overruling decisions such as Griswold v. Connecticut,46 on the 
ground that rights to privacy must yield to the ability of democratic institu-
tions to decide which individuals should have access to contraceptives and 
why.  
It is hard to sustain any close examination of the competing individual 
and state interests on the all too generous standard of Abigail Alliance. Put 
otherwise, the breadth of this deference claim seems to dispense with any 
close examination of the state interest that is put forward to limit individual 
autonomy. Yet any particularized review of the evidence shows the weak-
ness of the government’s case. It is surely understandable, by way of com-
parison, that individuals do not have the constitutional right to assisted sui-
cide, as the Supreme Court held in Washington v. Glucksberg47 and Vacco 
v. Quill.48 To be sure, people have a strong autonomy interest in ending 
their own lives when the anticipated pain is greater than any future joys 
from living. But there are risks as well, given the fragile competence of 
people in end-of-life situations and the risk of family members who may 
prefer to bring about their early deaths. In Abigail Burroughs’s case, the 
individual patient was seeking life, not death, and the perceived conflicts 
 
 40. Sue Kovach, The Abigail Alliance Motivated by Tragic Circumstances, Families 
Battle an Uncaring Bureaucracy, LIFE EXTENSION (SPECIAL EDITION) 25, 26 (2007).  
 41. The Abigail Story, http://abigail-alliance.org/story.htm (last visited Sept. 11, 2009). 
 42. News Release, U.S. Food & Drug Administration, FDA Approves Erbitux for Co-
lorectal Cancer (Feb. 12, 2004), available at http://www.fda.gov/ 
NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/2004/ucm108244.htm. 
 43. See Jerome Groopman, The Right to a Trial, NEW YORKER, Dec. 18, 2006, at 40, 
40 (explaining the formation and goals of the Abigail Alliance).  
 44. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Eschenbach, 
445 F.3d 470, 486 (D.C. Cir. 2006), rev’d en banc, 495 F.3d 695, 713 (D.C. Cir. 2007); see 
also Epstein, Erosion of Autonomy, supra note 4, at 574–76. 
 45. Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d at 713. 
 46. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 47. 521 U.S. 702, 735 (1997). 
 48. 521 U.S. 793, 797 (1997). 
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of interest among family members looked to be at a low ebb.49 Additional-
ly, when patients are not eligible for clinical trials there is no colorable 
claim that individual “opt-outs” will make it more difficult to secure accu-
rate information about drugs, one of the constant laments of the profes-
sional clinical trial organizations.50 And even when those difficulties arise, 
as they commonly do, it is a frightening prospect to think that the FDA can 
block individuals from seeking the treatment of their choice in order to fill 
out its ever-expanding rolls for clinical trials. To be sure, there is always a 
real risk of quackery and deception in dealing with cancer treatments.51 In 
all cases, however, these drugs can only be used under the supervision of a 
physician who remains subject to the ordinary tort and administrative law 
remedies for touting products that are known to be useless or worse.52  
It should be evident, therefore, that the policy dimensions of this dis-
pute have not been put to rest by the en banc decision in Abigail Alliance. 
The real question does not concern collective choice through legislation, 
but rather individual choice on matters of unique personal importance. The 
decision in Abigail Alliance, which blindly praised legislative deference, 
offers no instruction on how legislation should proceed.53 And it undoub-
tedly sidestepped the serious question of whether legislative intervention in 
personal precincts is justified as a matter of right.  
With the constitutional battle lost in Abigail Alliance, the struggle has 
now switched to the legislative and administrative arenas. What rules 
should Congress and the FDA adopt with respect to experimental and off-
label uses of drugs that have already been approved in some fashion? The 
current legal framework gives the FDA power to regulate the use of new 
drugs, but does not give it the power to practice medicine, which in effect 
facilitates off-label uses of drugs.54 Once a drug is on the market, the FDA 
cannot tell physicians how to use it. Physicians rely on trial and error, 
without the rigor or delay of clinical trials; anecdotal information spreads 
fairly quickly in a bottom-up fashion, often based on hunches, which is 
why surveys indicate that physicians strongly favor the continuation of off-
label uses.55 This sharing of information, however, is retarded because the 
 
 49. See Kovach, supra note 40, at 26–28.. 
 50. See Expanded Availability of Investigational New Drugs Through a Parallel Track 
Mechanism for People With AIDS and Other HIV-Related Disease, 57 Fed. Reg. 13,250, 
13,252 (Apr. 15, 1992) (explaining that “parallel track” programs that make investigational 
drugs accessible only to patients who do not meet the eligibility requirements for a clinical 
trial will not a impair the clinical trial process). 
 51. See, e.g., United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 558 (1978) (describing how 
“resourceful entrepreneurs” have historically marketed fraudulent concoctions and treat-
ments to vulnerable patients); see also Corrected En Banc Brief for the Appellees at 35–36, 
Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d 695 (No. 04 -5350) (“The history of drug use in the nineteenth 
century is a history of quackery and fraud, of desperate patients throwing away their money 
and their health on elixirs that did everything except cure diseases and save lives.”) (empha-
sis in original). 
 52. For a discussion of ordinary claims against physicians with respect to prescribing 
drugs, see Lauren Krohn, Cause of Action Against Physician for Negligence in Prescribing 
Drugs Or Medicines, in 9 CAUSES OF ACTION 1, 6–66 (Wesley H. Winborne ed., 1986). 
53 See Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Eschenbach, 495 
F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
 54. See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 301 (2006). For an exhaus-
tive discussion of this issue, see Sandra H. Johnson, Polluting Medical Judgment? False As-
sumptions in the Pursuit of False Claims Regarding Off-Label Prescribing, 9 MINN. J. L. 
SCI. & TECH. 61, 69–70 (2008). 
 55. See Daniel B. Klein & Alexander Tabarrok, Do Off-Label Drug Practices Argue 
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legal regime makes it flatly illegal for drug companies to promote any off-
label uses.56 The FDA justifies its position as follows:  
Permitting Sponsors to Promote Off-Label Uses: Would diminish or eliminate in-
centive to study the use and obtain definitive data[;] Could result in harm to pa-
tients from unstudied uses that actually lead to bad results, or that are merely inef-
fective[;] Would diminish the use of evidence-based medicine[;] Could ultimately 
erode the efficacy standard.57 
There is a real bite to these words. Pharmaceutical companies that 
have so behaved have been hit with heavy fines, including a settlement of 
$455 million for Pfizer58 and a $700 million settlement fee on Serono 
Labs.59 In addition to being liable for their own off-label promotion, phar-
maceutical companies may be held liable for assisting the generic makers 
in their promotion of a drug’s off-label use.60 These are not trivial expo-
sures. 
The legal situation with drugs that have yet to be approved is quite 
different because physicians are unable to use an unapproved drug as a 
therapy, as was the case with Abigail Burroughs.61 Patients face stark chal-
lenges in obtaining these unapproved drugs, including the possibility of 
enrolling in clinical trials where they may receive a placebo instead of the 
 
Against FDA Efficacy Requirements? A Critical Analysis of Physicians’ Argumentation for 
Initial Efficacy Requirements, 67 AM. J. ECON. & SOC. 743, 750 (2008) (“Of 492 physicians 
answering the question [of whether the FDA should restrict off-label uses], 460 opposed 
ending the freedom to prescribe off-label.”). 
 56. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(a), 331(d) (prohibiting marketing unapproved drugs); id. § 
352(f ) (defining a drug or device as “misbranded” if not properly labeled with directions for 
its use); see also U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMINISTRATION, GOOD REPRINT PRACTICES FOR 
THE DISTRIBUTION OF MEDICAL JOURNAL ARTICLES AND MEDICAL OR SCIENTIFIC REFER-
ENCE PUBLICATIONS ON UNAPPROVED NEW USES OF APPROVED DRUGS AND APPROVED 
OR CLEARED MEDICAL DEVICES (2009), http://www.fda.gov/oc/op/goodreprint.html (“An 
approved new drug that is marketed for an unapproved use is an unapproved new drug with 
respect to that use. An approved drug that is marketed for an unapproved use . . . is mi-
sbranded because the labeling of such drug does not include ‘adequate directions for use.”) 
(citations omitted). 
 57. Janet Woodcock, A Shift in the Regulatory Approach (June 23, 1997) (on file with 
the Minnesota Law Review) (PowerPoint presentation outlining the reasons for FDA poli-
cies on off-label uses); see also Final Guidance on Industry-Supported Scientific and Educa-
tional Activities, 62 Fed. Reg. 64,074, 64,081 (Dec. 3, 1997) (describing how banning pro-
motion of unapproved uses “protect[s] the public health by preserving the integrity of the 
premarket approval process” and maintains an incentive for manufacturers to conduct clini-
cal investigations, thus “encouraging scientific research and eliminating unnecessary harms 
to patients”); On Biostatistics and Clinical Trial, http:// 
onbiostatistics.blogspot.com/2009/02/evidence-based-medicine-evidence-gap 
.html (Feb. 14, 2009, 15:27 EST) (explaining the FDA’s rationale for prohibiting promotion 
of off-label uses). See generally David L. Sackett et al., Evidence Based Medicine: What It 
Is and What It Isn’t, 312 BRIT. MED. J. 71 (1996) (discussing the usefulness of and fears as-
sociated with the practice of evidence-based medicine). 
 58. See Johnson, supra note 54, at 114 (describing how the pharmaceutical company 
Parke-Davis paid over $455 million as a result of litigation over the drug Neurontin). Parke-
Davis was a division of Warner-Lambert, which later merged with Pfizer. Id. at 103 n.169. 
 59. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Serono to Pay $704 Million for the Illegal 
Marketing of AIDS Drug (Oct. 17, 2005), available at http://justice 
.gov/opa/pr/2005/October/05_civ_545.html. For a discussion of some of the First Amend-
ment issues arising from FDA restriction of pharmaceutical promotion to physicians, see 
Aaron S. Kesselheim & Jerry Avorn, Pharmaceutical Promotion to Physicians and First 
Amendment Rights, 358 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1727, 1727–28 (2008). 
 60. Amaris Elliott-Engel, Drug Companies on the Hook for Off-Label Use of Generic, 
LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Mar. 24, 2008, http://www.law.com/jsp/ 
article.jsp?id=1206096734896. 
 61. See Kovach, supra note 40, at 26–27. 
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drug or seeking a compassionate use exemption from the FDA to use an 
unapproved drug on an experimental basis.62 Compassionate use exemp-
tions are exceedingly difficult to obtain because the FDA can impose all 
sorts of preconditions which take months or years to satisfy.63 Drug com-
panies often impose additional hurdles to the availability of these unap-
proved drugs because they are worried about tort liability and their ability 
to recover the costs for the new treatments.  
One recent illustration of this tortuous process involves the long battle 
over the use of the drug Iplex, which was believed to relieve some symp-
toms of amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS), or Lou Gehrig’s disease.64 
The New York Times recently chronicled the efforts of Joshua Thomp-
son’s family to gain access to the drug Iplex.65 Iplex was not immediately 
available to the public due to a patent dispute between Insmed and Genen-
tech.66 Other drug choices, however, were limited because the FDA only 
had one approved drug on the market for ALS, with limited effectiveness, 
and another drug possibly scheduled for clinical trials.67 Thompson, how-
ever, was only able to procure a drug similar to Iplex, but only with diffi-
culty.  One doctore, for example,— refused to prescribe it because of the 
risk of hypoglycemia, or low blood sugar.68 Nonetheless Thompson 
wanted to try it on the strength of the positive reports about Iplex.69 Many 
doctors backed his choice.  But the issue quickly became a public adminis-
trative nightmare, in which the FDA initially denied permission before fi-
nally relenting in April 2009.70 By then Thompson had contracted pneu-
monia and was put on a ventilator, which often marks the beginning of the 
end.  Iplex, unfortunately, cannot reverse any prior deterioration.71 Better 
late than never does not make late better than early. 
Iplex may be a dead end. Life is lived, however, going forward, which 
makes the correct question whether state intervention improved Thomp-
son’s odds of survival. That question involves a delicate valuation on dif-
ferent states of disease and hard judgments on the probability of divergent 
outcomes. The answer to this question does not tip the balance back to-
ward the FDA permit system, for it is still the case that harms inflicted by 
medical treatment are no more deadly than those inflicted by nature. Indi-
vidual patients, in consultation with their physicians, undoubtedly make a 
raft of key decisions about their course of treatment. If patients are capable 
of making choices among a variety of approved treatments, why should 
they be deprived of the right to make that choice among the class of treat-
ments that have not been approved?  
One frequent objection is that desperate patients could be swayed by 
 
 62. See American Cancer Society, Compassionate Drug Use (2009), http:// 
www.cancer.org/docroot/ETO/content/ETO_1_2x_Compassionate_Drug_Use 
.asp.  
 63. See id. (describing requirements for access to unapproved new cancer drugs outside 
of a clinical trial). 
 64. See Harmon, supra note 35. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id.  
 71. Id. 
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false optimism or bad information, perhaps through advertisements.72 I 
took the position in a recent Wall Street Journal editorial that once drugs 
pass through Phase I trials (which are intended to deal with matters of tox-
icity), patients should then be free to take any drug combination they 
choose, even if they have not gone through the more extensive Phase II 
and Phase III trials (which are intended to deal with matters of efficacy).73 
The column elicited comments from many who were frustrated with the 
current system74 and the use of the Phase I filter, designed to weed out 
drugs with exceedingly high toxicities. Some readers who had experience 
with the FDA went even further, contending that the FDA should lose its 
ability to issue permits. 75 I do not categorically disagree with their posi-
 
 72. See MARCIA ANGELL, THE TRUTH ABOUT THE DRUG COMPANIES: HOW THEY 
DECEIVE US AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 135–55 (2004) (discussing the conflict of interest 
inherent in drug companies’ advertising and educating others about their own products); JE-
ROME KASSIRER, ON THE TAKE: HOW MEDICINE’S COMPLICITY WITH BIG BUSINESS CAN 
ENDANGER YOUR HEALTH 50–63, 79–103 (2004) (discussing conflicts of interest); Troyen 
A. Brennan, et al. Health Industry Practices That Create Conflicts of Interest: A Policy Pro-
posal for Academic Medical Centers, 295 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 429, 431–32 (2006) (propos-
ing heightened conflict of interest standards). For a critique of strong conflict of interest pro-
posals, see Richard A. Epstein, Conflicts of Interest in Health Care: Who Guards the 
Guardians, 50 PERSP. IN BIOL. & MED.72, 83–86 (2007) 73, 79–83 (asserting that regulators 
also face conflicts of interest and arguing against overregulating conflicts of interest); Tho-
mas Stossel, Regulation of Financial Conflicts of Interest in Medical Practice and Medical 
Research: A Damaging Solution in Search of a Problem, 50 PERSP. IN BIOL. & MED. 54, 67–
69 (2007) (attacking overreactions to conflicts of interest). 
 73. Richard A. Epstein, Op-Ed., Cancer Patients Deserve Faster Access to Life-Saving 
Drugs, WALL ST. J., May 2, 2009, at A1. 
 74. Typical of the reaction was Dr. Mark Fesen, who wrote: 
  As an oncologist in private practice, I encounter situations similar to 
this daily. In our group, we try to aggressively advocate for our patients. The bu-
reaucratic roadblocks that we frequently run into can be deadly serious for patients 
and disheartening for the staff. 
  One recent case involved a patient who is currently in pain suffering from a 
metastatic small bowel cancer. The several drugs approved and tested for colon 
cancer (Avastin, Erbitux, Camptosar, and Oxaliplatinum) have and will not and 
will not [sic] be tested for this rare type of cancer. Yet it makes intuitive sense to 
consider using them. Due to the lack of clinical trials studying these drugs in this 
situation, Medicare will not approve their use. NCCN guidelines, which follow 
evidence-based medicine and clinical trials, are of little help in this situation. Un-
fortunately, this patient, along with many others will pass away while suffering 
from a cancer for which useful treatment is likely very near. My patients’ only op-
tion is to risk self paying for these expensive drugs. 
E-mail from Dr. Mark Fesen, M.D., to author (May 3, 2009, 9:26 PM CDT) (on file with 
author).  
 75. Here is one such email:  
  As someone whose first husband died of cancer at age 40 (stomach cancer 
caught after it had metastasized to the liver), I appreciated your identifying much 
of what we went through, but I question the implied premise that the FDA should 
have any role in medicine. For instance, I would like to address your statement: 
“no one thinks that unapproved cancer drugs should be freely available to pa-
tients.” 
  We knew that my husband’s cancer was in all likelihood terminal, but it 
would have been far better to have had access to some drugs in the experimental 
stage than be told, as we were, to join the long waiting list for a clinical trial, 
which we did. By the time my husband’s name moved to the top of the list months 
later, he was too weak to travel to Texas where the study was being done. He died 
a few weeks later. 
  From your article, I believe you understand how devastating this situation was 
to my husband and his family. But if government increases its role in the health 
care decisions of all Americans, this kind of story will not be a rarity. Advocating 
“tweaks” in the present system will not suffice; it is the basic idea of government 
regulating medicine that must be addressed. 
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tion.  
For the moment, at least, I would leave in place the requirement that a 
drug pass Phase I trials. If that system works well, then perhaps even the 
Phase I trials could be eliminated, thereby demoting the FDA to a certify-
ing agency without licensing authority. Alternatively, if the expanded 
realm of patient choice produces serious problems, it should be possible to 
dial back individual choice to control abuse. Exactly how this approach 
would work in various contexts cannot be confidently predicted in the ab-
stract; maintaining the status quo, however, carries with it substantial risks 
as well. The best approach is to start small and to continuously work to ex-
pand individual choice if patient access to drugs that have passed Phase I 
trials produces no sign of systematic abuse. 
The argument for expanded patient choice rests on the proposition 
that the system already supports personal autonomy in healthcare. Quite 
simply, identical risks arise when individual physicians and patients are 
forced, as they always are, to make choices among lawful therapies. Do 
sufferers of prostate cancer prefer radiation, surgery, chemotherapy, pel-
lets, or some combination thereof?76 No one argues that the power of 
choice should be withdrawn from individual patients because of the dis-
tinct possibility that they will erroneously exercise it. The usual response is 
to counsel prudence in making private decisions, or, more dubiously, to 
impose procedural hurdles—such as counseling—before allowing individ-
uals to make certain decisions. The response is not to ban the ability to 
make those decisions. It is a mistake to throw out the baby with the bath-
water by assuming that personal imperfections in decisionmaking require a 
collective decision to disallow certain drugs from entering the market. The 
combination of institutional diligence, procedural safeguards, and self-help 
is the preferred response. 
II.  GATHERING GOOD INFORMATION   
The need to make decisions under conditions of uncertainty is espe-
cially critical in cancer cases, where the costs of error are measured in life-
and-death terms. Time is of the essence in responding to tumor growth; the 
earlier the time of detection, the likelier the prospects of beneficial treat-
ment.77 At the same time, the high toxicity of most cancer agents means 
that the use of the wrong compound or drug (or the wrong dosages of the 
right compound) could lead to either serious discomfort, earlier death, or 
both.78 The upside of proper treatment is usually low because curing cer-
tain cancers may well be a remote possibility. Frequently, the patient’s best 
hope is to prolong her life by years or even months, and perhaps, but not 
necessarily, improve her quality of life. Any insistence that approved can-
cer drugs will result in a complete cure would make the best the enemy of 
 
  The answer to our health care situation is to get the government out of the 
health care business and institute a completely free-market approach, getting rid of 
mandates and regulations that make the present system less than optimal in some 
cases, and disastrous in others. I hope you will consider arguments made by people 
like Paul Hsieh (www.WeStandFirm.org) in your thinking on this subject. 
E-mail from anonymous reader to author (May 4, 2009, 3:25 PM CDT) (on file with author). 
 76. See ABELOFF’S CLINICAL ONCOLOGY, supra note 26, at 1667–80 (describing vari-
ous prostate cancer treatments). 
 77. Id. at 361. 
 78. See id. at 459–81 (discussing chemotherapeutic drugs and their known toxicities, or 
side effects). 
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the good, given that perfection is unattainable. Not even the FDA insists on 
that. Usual treatment protocols call for the use of multiple drugs in se-
quence, starting with the least toxic drug, and when that treatment starts to 
falter, stronger agents are tried in turn until the drug cabinet is empty.79 
Physicians know this, of course, and there is little risk that they will leap-
frog to risky drugs when conventional therapies have not yet been tried. 
The grim prospect of most cancer treatment options is, however, not 
improved by FDA regulation. Cancer patients are precariously perched on 
the unhappy horns of an inescapable dilemma: the high costs of inaction, 
often resulting in death, versus the high costs of action, often resulting in 
faster death or serious distress. A patient’s decisions involve high rates of 
error in both directions, where each error carries a high expected loss. Yet 
however bleak the prospects, the same methodology applies: maximize ex-
pected value in deciding on a course of treatment, if any. Therefore, one 
defensible option is hospice care without treatment, when all the alterna-
tives look worse.80 In making these decisions, reliable information really 
matters because the illogical strategy is to base decisions solely on the ca-
sual accretion of information. A small reduction in the probability of an 
adverse outcome or short remission from treatment could produce enorm-
ous improvements in either the quality or length of life.  
The question is often whether improvement in outcomes for the indi-
vidual (and through that person, for society) is greater than the costs of ob-
taining better information. With most naïve patients, the answer is so clear-
ly yes that no cancer patient relies on his or her own judgment to decide 
which course of therapy or non-therapy to follow. The operative inquiry 
should be, and often is, whether further investment in information costs 
less than the gain from any anticipated reduction in error costs. Since the 
answer is often yes, how should we organize our systems of social control 
to maximize the rate of return from private investments in additional in-
formation, given the high values of human life?81  
III.  GOVERNMENT MONOPOLY VERSUS VOLUNTARY 
INTERMEDIARIES   
The central issue, therefore, is whether the government, voluntary in-
stitutions, or both, should be used to overcome the pervasive information 
shortfalls on drug treatments. I think that the answer here is clear. The 
government-run FDA should step out of the approval and permit process—
after the completion of Phase I clinical trials—thereby allowing decisions 
 
 79. See id. at 451. 
 80. See American Cancer Society, What Is Hospice Care?, http://www 
.cancer.org/docroot/ETO/content/Eto_2_5x_What_Is_Hospice_Care.asp (last visited Sept. 
13, 2009) (“Hospice care is meant for the time when cancer treatment can no longer help 
you.”). 
 81. One general conceit states that a human being should be treated as a “six million 
dollar man.” See Kevin Murphy & Robert Topel, Diminishing Returns?: The Costs and Ben-
efits of Improving Health, 46 PERSP. BIOL. & MED. S108, S110–15 (2003) (calculating the 
value of increasing longevity). There are many complications here, including questions of 
the sensitivity of the value of life to age and health conditions, but the revealed behavior 
suggests a high number. The precise number does not matter so long as it is large. But the 
size of the information gap sets in motion a set of private and public strategies toward data 
collection that shape the social organization for the provision of cancer treatment. Improve 
odds by five percent and, as a first approximation, there is substantial social gain, which if 
not $300,000, is still substantial. See id. at S111. With error costs high and mistakes com-
mon, it makes sense for everyone to invest heavily in knowledge. 
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to rest in the hands of patients and their physicians.  
In this new scenario, the FDA retains a key role in protecting public 
health, but has little responsibility in approving or disapproving cancer 
therapies. A powerful state presence is needed, for example, to insure the 
health and safety of the public at large. The FDA should focus its resources 
on the rash of contaminated food that has poured in from overseas and on 
the extensive counterfeiting rings that seek to inject defective foods and 
drugs into this nation’s distribution pipeline.82 Honest manufacturers will 
go to enormous lengths by themselves to protect their brands against per-
ceived defects in quality, as Johnson & Johnson did in recalling Tylenol 
after someone laced its tablets with cyanide.83 These private efforts must 
be backed by government regulations that can impose criminal sanctions 
on various malefactors who try to sell dangerous or purloined goods. In-
deed, private manufacturers often welcome and advertise “FDA-approval” 
to increase consumer confidence in their products.84 
Drug treatments relating to oncology, however, are unrelated to mat-
ters of drug purity or consumer confidence. The distribution of cancer 
drugs does not require the FDA to strengthen public communication, as 
might be required for those drugs that large numbers of ordinary individu-
als take on a regular basis.85 In contrast, oncology drugs are distributed 
through restricted channels and only to people who understand how and 
why they are administered.86 In instances of cancer, patients and their doc-
tors must assemble information to understand the tradeoffs on the safety 
and the effectiveness of drugs in their own individual cases. It is politically 
unwise to give any agency, however skilled or competent, monopoly con-
trol over whether people may use a particular drug or therapy when it lacks 
the individualized calculation of whether, for example, patients have risk 
factors for particular treatments. Indeed, if the FDA rejects a new drug ap-
plication, the product or service may not be sold at all, which necessarily 
has high Type II error costs. Even if the FDA allows the drug to be mar-
keted, it can subject it to various conditions that relate to pricing, advertis-
 
 82. See, e.g., Robert Cockburn et al., The Global Threat of Counterfeit Drugs: Why 
Industry and Governments Must Communicate the Dangers, 4 PUB. LIBR. OF SCI. MED. 302, 
302–08 (2005) (discussing why government has to counteract the risk of counterfeit drugs); 
Paul M. Rudolf & Ilisa B.G. Bernstein, Counterfeit Drugs, 350 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1384, 
1384–86 (2004) (noting the rising incidence of counterfeit drugs). The process has world-
wide implications. See Roger Bate, New Tools to Fight Fake Medicines, AM. ENTERPRISE 
INST. FOR PUB. POL’Y RES., May 13, 2009, http://www.aei.org/article/100492. 
 83. Mallenbaker.net, Companies in Crisis—What to Do When It All Goes Wrong, 
www.mallenbaker.net/csr/crisis02.html (recounting the response to incidents in 1982 and 
1986 when seven people died in Chicago after consuming cyanide-laced Tylenol, causing a 
loss of one billion dollars in market value after the 1982 incident and spurring wide recalls 
and the creation of tamper proof packages after the 1986 incident).  
 84. See U.S. Food & Drug Administration, Is It Really FDA Approved?, 
http://www.fda.gov/ForConsumers/ConsumerUpdates/ucm047470.htm# 
biologics (last visited Sept. 12, 2009) (noting some manufacturers may say their products are 
“FDA-approved”). 
 85. Cf. Posting of Peter Pitts to DrugWonks.com, http://www.drugwonks 
.com/blog_post/show/ 4755 (Feb. 28, 2008, 5:58 EST) (approving the FDA Commissioner’s 
remarks about how clera FDA communications combats the erosion of consumer trust). 
 86. See, e.g., American Cancer Society, FDA Approves Advanced Prostate Cancer 
Drug, Feb. 12, 2003, http://www.cancer.org/docroot/NWS/content/NWS 
2_1x_FDA_ Approves_Advanced_Prostate_Cancer_Drug.asp (last visited Oct. 1, 2009) (de-
scribing a cancer drug that can only be prescribed by a limited number of doctors due to its 
serious side effects). 
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ing, and permissible users, among others, which can limit its dissemination 
and use.87 Additional requests for new data or to conduct additional clini-
cal tests breed further delay, which both raises treatment costs and leads 
people to forego the drugs’ use.88 Warnings of negative side effects, for 
example, are calculated to lower the expectations of potential users. The 
concerns here are not hypothetical, for just this pattern emerged with Pro-
zac,89 where decreased use for treating teenage and young adult depression 
is highly correlated with warnings about increases in the suicidal behavior 
that Prozac allegedly causes.90 
One implicit but incorrect assumption is that FDA competence must 
be compared with the joint knowledge of an individual patient and his or 
her physician, both of which could prove to be limited. Defenders of the 
FDA are right to point out that collective generation of the information is 
usually superior to individual impressions.91 They are wrong, however, to 
assume that government agencies are the only bodies that can assemble 
and interpret the relevant information. It is more advisable to compare the 
FDA to voluntary associations, including those that deal with oncology.92 
Individual patients and physicians already rely on these voluntary organi-
zations to serve as intermediaries between them and the manufacturers or 
sellers of cancer drugs for medications that are licensed for particular 
uses.93 There is no reason why their role cannot be extended.  
To understand why, recall that voluntary organizations are not whim-
 
 87. Recently, the FDA has demanded a “Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategy,” or 
“REMS,” in some circumstances. That requirement could undermine the present legal 
framework that allows doctors to make off-label uses of drugs. See U.S. Food & Drug Ad-
ministration, Questions and Answers on the Federal Register Notice on Drugs and Biologi-
cal Products Deemed to Have Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies, 
http://www.fda.gov/RegulatoryInformation/ 
Legislation/FederalFoodDrugandCosmeticActFDCAct/SignificantAmendments 
totheFDCAct/FoodandDrugAdministrationAmendmentsActof2007/ucm095439 
.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2009) (explaining the Identification of Drug and Biological Prod-
ucts Deemed to Have Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies for Purposes of the Food 
and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, 73 Fed. Reg. 16,313, at 16,313 (Mar. 
27, 2008)). 
 88. See The Law of Biologic Medicine: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
108th Cong. 122–35 (2004) (submission of Lester M. Crawford, Acting Comm’r of Food & 
Drugs, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.) (noting that faster FDA approval of drugs reduces 
their cost and increases their availability). 
 89. See, e.g., PHYSICIANS’ DESK REFERENCE 1852 (63d ed. 2009) (describing Prozac 
as an antidepressant that functions as a selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor (SSRI), which 
blocks the absorption of serotonin into the blood). 
 90. The abstract of one study states the following conclusion:  
SSRI prescriptions for youths decreased by approximately 22% in both the United 
States and the Netherlands after the warnings were issued. In the Netherlands, the 
youth suicide rate increased by 49% between 2003 and 2005 and shows a signifi-
cant inverse association with SSRI prescriptions. In the United States, youth sui-
cide rates increased by 14% between 2003 and 2004, which is the largest year-to-
year change in suicide rates in this population since the Centers for Disease Con-
trol and Prevention began systematically collecting suicide data in 1979.  
Robert D. Gibbons et al., Early Evidence on the Effects of Regulators’ Suicidality Warnings 
on SSRI Prescriptions and Suicide in Children and Adolescents, 164 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 
1356, 1356 (2007).  
 91. See Arnold S. Relman, To Lose Trust, Every Day, NEW REPUBLIC, July 23, 2007, 
at 36, 40 (2007) (reviewing EPSTEIN, OVERDOSE, supra note 19). 
 92. Cf. Reed Abelson & Andrew Pollack, Medicare Widens Drugs It Accepts for Can-
cer Care, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2009, at A1 (discussing new policies regarding the FDA’s 
use of recommendations from voluntary organizations). 
 93. See id. 
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sical creations. Indeed they are fixtures in many contexts that are unrelated 
to cancer or medicine.94 They are typically nonprofit organizations that 
serve the same basic intermediation function in virtually all markets: to 
collect, digest, and interpret material for their members in areas where 
there is an information shortfall. They set best practice standards and con-
vey these standards to their membership on a national and global level, so 
that doctors in the United States can benefit from information obtained 
from Europe or Asia.95 Unlike government monopolies, these organiza-
tions operate by persuasion, not coercion,96 and they act in competition 
with each other. Participating physician members use information from 
such organizations as they will, knowing that they can report their own ex-
periences back to the standing body in a conscious and continuous feed-
back loop. If one organization falters, as can easily happen, others pick up 
the slack.97 So long as there is no monopoly control, physicians can search 
out the best sources of information.98 
These groups are formed with respect to virtually every specialty, 
which in turn is broken down by subspecialties. They have budgets,99 or-
ganized subcommittees,100 extensive websites,101 clear missions,102 and a 
proven ability to quickly compile complex information.103 And they work 
hard to make their databases interactive.104 The gains from creating these 
intermediaries evidently dwarf the transaction costs needed to put these 
groups together: if that were not the case, these groups would not be so 
widespread. Within medicine they can supply information the FDA is too 
hidebound to collect and disseminate. They can also go further than mak-
ing a simple judgment of whether to license by recommending the proper 
sequence for the use of various cancer treatments that distinguishes first-
line treatments from those of last resort. 
These intermediate institutions assume special importance because of 
the peculiar structure of U.S. food and drug laws, which create a sharp dis-
tinction between on-label drug uses that the manufacturer can promote and 
off-label drug uses that manufacturers cannot promote, even if they use in-
formation that was published and disseminated in established journals.105 
 
 94. See NATIONAL TRADE AND PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS OF THE UNITED 
STATES at i–viii (Valerie S. Sheridan ed., Columbia Books, 43d ed. 2008), for a list of over 
7,600 trade associations in the United States, many of which serve multiple functions. 
 95. See id. at ii (noting international cooperation). 
 96. See id. at iii (“Both membership and donor-based organizations are heavily reliant 
on public trust . . . .”). 
 97. See Abelson & Pollack, supra note 92 (noting the use of alternative references). 
 98. Cf. id. (giving examples of various sources of information). 
 99. See id. (describing the funding systems of some groups). 
 100. See id. (noting the steps taken to control conflicts of interest within committees). 
 101. See, e.g., American Chronic Pain Association, http://www.theacpa.org/ (last visited 
Sept. 13, 2009). 
 102. For an example of one voluntary organization’s mission statement, see id. 
 103. See Abelson & Pollack, supra note 92 (stating that Medicare’s new policy of using 
recommendations from more voluntary organizations is partly in response to concerns that 
“the agency has been too slow to recognize promising new off-label treatments”). 
 104. See, e.g., Society of Thoracic Surgeons, Welcome to the STS National Database, 
http://www.sts.org/sections/stsnationaldatabase/ (last visited Sept. 13, 2009). 
 105. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 352 (2006) (regulating drug 
labeling); see also United States v. Caronia, 576 F. Supp. 2d 385, 392 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (“It 
is well established that under the FDA’s ‘intended use’ regulations, the promotion of a drug 
for an off-label use by the manufacturer or its representative is prohibited regardless of what 
directions the manufacturer or representative may give for that use.”). See generally John-
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The current legal landscape thus creates an unfortunate legal no-man’s-
land. If a drug is not approved for any use at all, then patients cannot use it 
to treat any ailment. Physicians may still learn about these unapproved 
drugs from the limited information released about the outcomes of clinical 
trials. Once a drug is approved for one use, however, the decision over off-
label uses lies within the ambit of physicians and hospitals, given that the 
FDA cannot regulate medical practice.106 
Off-label uses are a staple of cancer treatment.107 Clinical trials are 
extremely expensive and the FDA, under Congressional prodding, contin-
ues to add requirements that increase the size of the patient cohort and the 
various subdivisions within it.108 Consequently, drug owners are reluctant 
to run clinical trials for new indications—i.e. different types of tumors—
while physicians are reluctant to include patients in clinical trials.109 It be-
comes troublesome, and almost immoral, to subject very sick individuals 
to clinical trials when the available evidence, however sketchy, suggests 
that off-label use is likely more advantageous than standard treatments that 
have been tried and have failed. Strong reasons back patients’ reluctance to 
participate in clinical trials for off-label uses. First, patients are often un-
willing or unable to participate in trials because their odds of getting a pla-
cebo during the clinical trial are quite high, often between thirty-three and 
fifty percent.110 “Some estimates, however, indicate that over half of the 
prescription medications provided to patients in the United States may be 
prescribed for a purpose, in a higher or lower dose, over a longer period of 
time, or for a population (such as children) different from that for which 
the drug has been approved.”111 Second, manufactures have no financial 
incentive to undertake trials. A standard drug or treatment has a limited pa-
tent life that starts to run long before commercialization.112 Typically, off-
label uses proliferate through clinical trials only in rare circumstances—
such as using Thalomide for treating multiple myeloma.113 The accumula-
tion of information about off-label uses takes additional time during which 
the patent clock keeps running. Why should any patentee spend a fortune 
on clinical trials for a drug that will go generic shortly after the clinical tri-
 
son, supra note 54, at 81–83 (discussing some of the difficulties surrounding the regulation 
of off-label drug use). 
 106. U.S. Food & Drug Administration, Questions and Answers: Problem Reporting, 
http://www.fda.gov/Safety/ReportaProblem/QuestionsandAnswers 
ProblemReporting/default.htm#problems (last visited Sept. 13, 2009) (noting “medical prac-
tice” is not handled by the FDA). 
 107. See American Cancer Society, Off-Label Drug Use, http://www.cancer 
.org/docroot/ETO/content/ETO_1_2x_Off-Label_Drug_Use.asp (last visited Sept. 12, 2009) 
(“Off-label drug use is very common in cancer treatment.”).  
 108. See Steve Usdin, Regulation: System Reset in 2008, BIOCENTURY, Jan. 21, 2008, 
at A1, A3–A4. 
 109. See id. (discussing how costs of the clinical trial scheme dissuade drug develop-
ment). 
 110. See Sharona Hoffman, The Use of Placebos in Clinical Trials: Responsible Re-
search or Unethical Practice?, 33 CONN. L. REV. 449, 453 (2000).  
 111. Johnson, supra note 54, at 61 (citations omitted).  
 112. See Margaret Gilhooley, Drug Preemption and the Need to Reform the FDA Con-
sultation Process, 34 AM. J.L. & MED. 539, 552 (2008) (“Manufacturers are concerned 
about the limited patent life of their drugs and the need to recoup the considerable cost of 
drug testing within a limited time frame.”). 
 116. See Miranda Hitti, Thalidomide OK'd for Multiple Myeloma, WEBMD Health 
News, May 26, 2006, http://www.webmd.com/mental-health/bulimia-
nervosa/news/20060526/thalidomide-okd-for-multiple-myeloma. 
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als are completed? Notwithstanding these difficulties, the off-label uses of 
cancer drugs do not fall into a void, for there is an exhaustive physician-
driven literature that studies off-label uses of particular drugs. This exten-
sive literature is routinely correlated by intermediate agencies which pub-
lish the information. The quality of these reviews is often less than ideal. A 
study by Amy Abernethy and colleagues reviews six such compendia114 
and notes serious gaps within the individual sources and obvious room for 
improvement.115  
Nonetheless, the shortfalls of one publication can be offset by infor-
mation obtainable from another source, since physicians can consult mul-
tiple references. The existence of gaps in any one source does not neces-
sarily lead to a parallel gap for physicians. In addition, any new entry 
could, of course, improve matters. After the publication of her study, Ab-
ernethy noted that she did not oppose the decision of Medicare to reim-
burse for off-label uses.116 Indeed in some cases the resources from indi-
vidual sites are impressive. The National Comprehensive Cancer Network 
(NCCN) maintains a wide-ranging website that offers extensive informa-
tion about clinical practice guidelines for various cancers, including off-
label uses.117 Readers of the NCCN website can find breast cancer guide-
lines that offer insights on how to treat inflammatory breast cancer, which 
is described as both “rare” and “aggressive.”118 The use of the words rare 
and aggressive indicates the importance of the voluntary transmission of 
information. Aggressive cancers obviously need attention, but physicians 
who practice away from major medical centers would necessarily struggle 
to gather information about these rare conditions. A national (or even 
global) network can better accumulate information on rare diseases by 
publishing resources more rapidly than any federal agency.  
Does it matter that these extensive off-label uses do not meet the FDA 
standards? It would if we were confident that centralized government 
science outperforms voluntary organizations. But there is no evidence to 
support that conclusion. Today’s fractured system of regulation, part coer-
cive and part voluntary, arises from the fact that the FDA is not organized 
to supply information on a continuous basis that keeps pace with medical 
advances. Indeed nothing is more common, even for a lawyer, than to hear 
physicians decry—but always off the record—that FDA protocols, warn-
ings and guidelines have “nothing to do” with good medical practice.119 It 
is not a healthy institutional situation for serious physicians to believe that 
the FDA retards medical research by—to give the common number I have 
 
 114. See Abernethy et al., supra note 17, at 336.  
 115. Id. at 341–42.  
 116. Interestingly enough, despite her reservations, Dr. Abernethy noted more recently 
that she did not oppose the new Medicare rules and cited new entry into the market as her 
reason. See Abelson & Pollack, supra note 92, (“I think the addition of the new compendia 
this year is an important increase in the bandwidth.”) (quoting Dr. Abernethy).  
 117. National Comprehensive Cancer Network, http://www.nccn.org (last visited Sept. 
13, 2009). 
 118. Press Release, National Comprehensive Cancer Network, NCCN Updates Breast 
Cancer Guidelines (Jan. 22, 2008), available at http://www.nccn 
.org/about/news/archived_news.asp (follow “2008” hyperlink; then follow “NCCN Updates 
Breast Cancer Guidelines” hyperlink). 
 119. See Richard A. Epstein, The Case for Field Preemption of State Laws in Drug Cas-
es, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 463, 471 (2009) (“[T]he physician is in the best position to deter-
mine if a treatment that is undesirable in some patients is desirable in others . . . .”). 
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heard—between three and five years.120 
These cautionary signs are not always heeded. Even today many med-
ical experts champion full-scale clinical trials before allowing drugs into 
general use.121 In doing so, however, they misconceive the full nature of 
the problem. No one, of course, wants to ban clinical trials. Nonetheless 
palpable difficulties arise in insisting that clinical trials should be strictly 
required for all new drug uses. Trials often start at inconvenient times for 
patients and patients lack options if trials are not open; think back to Ab-
igail Burroughs. “Reliable” information also is, in Churchill’s words, “too 
little, too late”122 for a cancer patient whose options have run dry. A quick 
and dirty treatment often offers the best chance of survival. 
In light of these considerations, our proper focus should be on how 
much a patient has to forego for the “privilege” of participating in a clini-
cal trial. Those costs necessarily decrease in light of the alternative ave-
nues used to obtain information through the NCCN or similar organiza-
tions. In particular, it would be instructive to learn which off-label uses 
were modified or discontinued given their poor performance or, alterna-
tively, what were the performance levels of off-label uses that have worked 
their way into common practice without going through clinical trials. 
Another useful study would compare the reliability of information disse-
minated about a drug’s on-label and off-label use, to see if the frequency of 
adverse events from the off-label use exceeds those from any permitted 
use. Off-label uses are only for drugs that have already passed Phase I clin-
ical trials, so that high toxicity is not a risk. Accumulated information for 
off-label uses could prove more reliable than clinical trials. I suspect that 
off-label uses are about as effective and safe as the on-label uses. If that 
hypothesis should prove true, it undermines the argument that clinical tri-
als are the gold standard for measuring safety and effectiveness. If the hy-
pothesis were false, then there would be a slow and steady decline in off-
label uses, which does not appear to be occurring. 
IV.  CENTRALIZED VERSUS DECENTRALIZED KNOWLEDGE   
We are now in a position to step back from the particulars of this dis-
pute to examine the larger questions of the proper theory of knowledge ac-
quisition. The current FDA clinical trial model reflects a belief in top-
down knowledge, a theory which prefers the centralized collection and 
evaluation of information over decentralized methods. In effect, the FDA 
represents a modern central planning paradigm of the sort that F.A. Hayek 
effectively criticized when socialism was at its height.123 Single sources of 
 
 120. See INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., THE FUTURE OF DRUG SAFETY 31–64 
(Alina Bacin et al. eds., 2007) (describing the drug regulatory process).  
 121. Thus I have been chastised as follows:  
Does Epstein really not understand that properly designed and conducted clinical 
trials are now universally accepted as the most reliable means of determining the 
effectiveness of a drug . . . [or that] [c]linical trials . . . changed the basis for the 
use of drugs from something akin to hearsay and witchcraft to something much 
closer to science[?] 
Relman, supra note 91, at 40. 
 122. EUGENE L. RASOR, WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, 1874–1965, at 261 (2000).  
 123. F. A. Hayek, Socialist Calculation: The Competitive ‘Solution,’ 7 ECONOMICA 
125, 125–27 (1940); F. A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 
519, 524 (1945). For my approach to limited knowledge, see generally Richard A. Epstein, 
The Uses and Limits of Local Knowledge: A Cautionary Note on Hayek, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & 
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control lack the redundancy to correct error, stifle the initiative that makes 
for advantages, and cannot coordinate and assemble information that is 
held in discrete packets by private individuals.  
There is ample reason to think that Hayek’s diagnosis accurately cap-
tures the lumbering condition of today’s FDA. The FDA’s defenders note 
that even the recent statutory reforms124 have left the FDA “chronically 
under-funded,”125 particularly with respect to post-marketing surveillance. 
Officials worry that the rise of new scientific fields and techniques will 
quickly supersede the abilities of the FDA.126 Commonly, Congress re-
sponds to these rigidities with budgetary, rather than structural, solutions. 
Accordingly, the usual response attacks “inadequate funding” by asking 
for more,127 only to find that their prayers have been answered by the Ob-
ama administration.128 Increased funding to protect the food supply is wel-
come, but funding to test for safer medical products could easily be coun-
terproductive by slowing down the introduction of new products into the 
market. The fundamental question is never asked: whether any centralized 
agency can be nimble enough to process information. On this score the 
dismal history of central planning in every other sector of the economy 
suggests that serious improvements cannot be reached by putting the FDA 
on steroids. Just think of the information imbalances that remain no matter 
what the size of the FDA. The applications for new drug approval are all 
prepared by scientists that have dozens of years of experience dealing with 
a single compound for a single treatment. To be sure, cancer becomes a 
broad umbrella under which many different subspecialties develop. The 
FDA does not have the institutional capability to develop a parallel exper-
tise on the opposite side of the line. Instead it has to work through all-
purpose cancer generalists who cannot match the detailed knowledge that 
the applicant can muster in support of its application.129 The knowledge 
differential leads to excessive caution, which translates into more hesita-
tion, more cost, and more delay. No funding increase can alter this know-
ledge imbalance. The dangers of permititis rest on the simple observation 
that the current regulatory structure gives too much power to too few indi-
 
LIBERTY 205 (2005) (contrasting local and formal knowledge) and Richard A. Epstein, In-
tuition, Custom, and Protocol: How to Make Sound Decisions with Limited Knowledge, 2 
N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 1 (2006) (discussing how intuition, custom, and protocol create 
knowledge).  
 124. See Presciption Drug User Fee Amendments of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-85, 121 Stat. 
823, 825–978 (2007). 
 125. David A. Kessler & David C. Vladeck, A Critical Examination of the FDA’s Ef-
forts to Preempt Failure-to-Warn Claims, 96 GEO. L.J. 461, 472 (2008); see also INST. OF 
MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note 120, at 193 (“There is little dispute that the FDA in 
general is . . . severely underfunded.”).  
 126. See SUBCOMMITTEE ON SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY, FDA SCIENCE BOARD, FDA 
SCIENCE AND MISSION AT RISK 22 (2007). 
 127. Id. at 6.  
 128. Vitabeat, Obama’s Budget Expands FDA’s Food, Medicine Safety Funding, May 
12, 2009, http://www.vitabeat.com/obamas-budget-expands-fdas-food-medicine-safety-
funding/v/10173/ (“Obama’s budget will give an additional nineteen percent in funding to 
the FDA’s two major projects; protecting America’s food supply and ensuring safer medical 
products.”).  
 129. Cf. U.S. Food & Drug Administration, How Drugs are Developed and Approved, 
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugs 
areDevelopedandApproved/default.htm (noting that a team of “physicians, statisticians, 
chemists, pharmacologists, and other scientists” reviews any new drug application submitted 
for FDA approval). 
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viduals. Money alone cannot change this. 
In some sense the situation is even worse. The FDA chokehold posi-
tion in all likelihood slows down the dissemination of information about 
various forms of drug treatment. Recently the FDA floated an idea to allow 
drug companies to disseminate information about off-label uses that have 
appeared in peer-reviewed journals,130 which means virtually all journals. 
The proposal has predictably been met with resistance from the adherents 
of the centralized model who think that the FDA should keep as much con-
trol over drug information as possible.131 This position seems clearly to be 
wrong, perhaps even perverse. First, the mere fact that reputable journals 
publish clinical studies on off-label uses shows that an extensive gray mar-
ket has developed, which is a sign of a dysfunctional regulatory system. 
Second, the distribution of peer-reviewed studies responds to the reserva-
tions about the FDA system of clinical trials. That system runs its clinical 
trials on limited populations for limited periods of time. The post-release 
studies help overcome both these inherent limitations because, almost by 
definition, they involve longer time periods with larger numbers of pa-
tients.132  
Encouraging circulation of these articles has the added benefit of in-
creasing the availability of independent knowledge about drugs. Ironically, 
the FDA’s proposal to allow only the drug manufacturers to distribute the 
information leads to biased information, as companies can choose to selec-
tively release information.133 Instead, the FDA should post all the informa-
tion about off-label uses on its websites, thereby offsetting any perceived 
weaknesses in the alternative sources of information, e.g., the various 
compendia about off-label uses.134 The objective must be the best dissemi-
 
 130. News Release, U.S. Food & Drug Administration, FDA Proposes Guidance for 
Dissemination of Information on Unapproved Uses of Medical Products (Feb. 15, 2008), 
available at http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/ 
Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/2008/ucm116859.htm (recommending that distribution be 
limited to peer-reviewed journals with editorial boards that have conflict of interest policies); 
see Anna Wilde Mathews & Avery Johnson, Boost for Off-Label Drug Use: FDA Would Let 
Firms Keep Doctors Informed on Unapproved Methods, WALL. ST. J., Feb. 16, 2008, at A3 
(reporting on the FDA proposal). 
 131. See Mathews & Johnson, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined.. 
 132. See ABELOFF’S CLINICAL ONCOLOGY, supra note 26, at 327–35 (describing sever-
al opportunities for physicians and patients to participate in clinical trials and the review 
process for clinical trials).  
 133. See Jeanne Lenzer, Drug Secrets: What the FDA Isn’t Telling, SLATE, Sept. 25, 
2005, http://www.slate.com/id/2126918/ (noting that even if a drug is already on the market 
for different uses, trade secret concerns may lead drug companies to not divulge results from 
failed clinical trials that have adverse events). 
 134. In general, I support the publication of trade secret information needed to evaluate 
serious health risks. That also seems to be the general principle in Corn Products Refining 
Co. v. Eddy, which stated:  
[I]t is too plain for argument that a manufacturer or vendor has no constitutional 
right to sell goods without giving to the purchaser fair information of what it is 
that is being sold. The right of a manufacturer to maintain secrecy as to his com-
pounds and processes must be held subject to the right of the State, in the exercise 
of its police power and in promotion of fair dealing, to require that the nature of 
the product be fairly set forth. 
249 U.S. 427, 431–32 (1919). This rationale clearly applies to drugs that might have harmful 
effects; however, similar disclosures of trade secrets should not be applied when these risks 
of adulteration, misbranding, or danger to health are not present. See Richard A. Epstein, 
The Constitutional Protection of Trade Secrets Under the Takings Clause, 71 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 57, 61–73 (2004) (discussing which risks should be disclosed and why that raises hard 
questions of implementation). 
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nation of information that helps saves lives. The FDA cannot guard against 
the possibility that posting this information will be interpreted as an im-
permissible implied promotion of an off-label use; it should not try to 
maintain that empty façade. 
We can take the argument one step further. A better option would be 
to allow companies to promote drugs for established off-label uses, that is, 
those covered by Medicare or private insurance. This approach would al-
low companies to effectively market these drugs. For example, the FDA 
recently allowed Genentech to gain accelerated market approval of Avastin 
(bevacizumab) for breast cancer, which immediately resulted in an eight-
percent increase in the market value of its shares.135 In turn, this accele-
rated market approval allows Genentech to produce for the new uses, 
which leads to more rapid information dissemination than the NCCN can 
supply. Genentech undoubtedly gained hundreds of millions of dollars 
from the FDA decision, but the increase in the market value of the firm 
understates the social gain from this FDA decision. The increase in share 
value does not include the anticipated consumer surplus (subjective value 
less market price) to users. These numbers are likely to be very large in-
deed, given the intrinsic value of life and the restricted wealth of many pa-
tients—which means that no pricing system, however clever, can capture 
the entire relevant surplus. There are some fortunate consequences to the 
imperfect correlation between utility and wealth.136 For example, AIDS 
drugs can produce immense benefits to patients far beyond their ability to 
pay.137 So long as the companies can cover their expenses, they will con-
tinue to produce these drugs, even if they cannot capture the full amount of 
the patient surplus in fees. 
V.  THE FDA DECISIONS ON CANCER DRUGS   
The relative theoretical competence of decentralized and centralized 
systems is borne out by a closer examination of the FDA’s decisionmaking 
processes. Generally, the power to issue permits gives administrative offi-
cials enormous control. In any permit system the individual applicant has 
the burden to show that the product in question meets all government safe-
ty standards.138 Conversely, the standard judicial rule is that injunctions 
against actions that might harm other persons should be issued only after a 
showing of an imminent risk of a serious harm.139 Thus the permit system 
gives public officials far greater power than the standard form of injunctive 
relief. 
 
 135. See Andrew Pollack, Wider Use of Avastin Is Approved, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 
2008, at C1 (discussing the increase in share values after Avastin’s approval); see also Ma-
rilyn Chase & Anna Wilde Mathews, Genentech Clears Hurdle on Cancer Drug Avastin, 
WALL ST. J., Feb. 23–24, 2008, at A3 (reporting on Avastin’s approval). 
 136. See Tomas J. Philipson & Anupam B. Jena, Who Benefits from New Medical Tech-
nologies? Estimates of Consumer and Producer Surpluses for HIV/AIDS Drugs, 9 F. FOR 
HEALTH ECON. & POL’Y, Issue 2, art. 3, at 16 (2006), 
http://www.bepress.com/fhep/biomedical_research/3/ (noting that even with unregulated 
prices, drug innovators could only capture about five percent of the social surplus through 
innovation). 
 137. See id. at 1 (noting that, in the aggregate, there is a $1.33 trillion dollar consumer 
surplus in the total lifetime value of HIV/AIDS drugs). 
 138. Cf. Richard A. Epstein, The Permit Power Meets the Constitution, 81 IOWA L. 
REV. 407, 414–19 (1995) (discussing how permit systems currently operate). 
 139. See id. at 414. 
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The power given to the FDA exceeds its ability to discharge its obli-
gations, as all agree that the FDA lacks the resources or expertise needed 
to evaluate cutting-edge scientific technologies.140 The FDA’s difficulties 
do not stop with this endemic problem. Two other issues, each illustrated 
by recent developments in the field, are also noteworthy. These involve, 
first, the articulation of standards for intelligent judgment, and, second, the 
risk of influence from powerful political or economic interests.  
A. STANDARDS OF JUDGMENT 
Drug bans must necessarily draw sharp lines between products al-
lowed into the market and those which are kept off. Any estimation of 
safety and effectiveness necessarily lies on a two-dimensional continuum, 
which makes it nigh impossible to impose defensible rulings on when the 
ban is desirable and when it is not. Any revision of an initial decision is 
necessarily subject to similar difficulties. Voluntary organizations, which 
advise but do not ban, do not face this problem. They report all the infor-
mation, and members choose which course of treatment to follow based on 
the report and patient preference.141 Clearly other factors are likely to be 
involved, but those complexities do not alter this basic conclusion.  
A full evaluation of a particular drug leads some physician-patient 
pairs to use drugs in ways that other physician-patient pairs will not. The 
variation in uses allows scientists to update their assessment of the overall 
utility of a particular product. Thereafter, everyone can make timely revi-
sions of their initial decisions. Use will decline when the early findings are 
bad and will increase when they are good. Additionally, as more data ar-
rives, the protocols and the counterindications will become clearer, allow-
ing for a greater convergence in judgment over time. These decentralized 
adjustments are less vulnerable to the peculiar preferences (or prejudices) 
of a single FDA committee, whose members, after all, are chosen by the 
FDA itself.142 If the bottleneck created by the FDA’s permit power is re-
moved, the product use will increase, revenues will move upward, and 
more research will take place.  
A further danger of centralized systems is that government officials 
tend to over-rely on objective measures, most notably the extension of life, 
to decide which products to allow into the marketplace. They cannot enter 
into complex and subtle tradeoffs. Decisions that deal with quality of life 
are often put on the back burner. The FDA also ignores the variations of 
patient responses by basing its decision on average responses.143 This ap-
 
 140. See SUBCOMMITTEE ON SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY, FDA SCIENCE BOARD, FDA 
SCIENCE AND MISSION AT RISK: ESTIMATED RESOURCES REQUIRED FOR IMPLEMENTATION 
8–9 (2008), available at http://energycommerce 
.house.gov/Press_110/022508.ScienceBoardReport.EstimatedResources.pdf (noting that 
“FDA lacks information technology (IT) capability and capacity to support monitoring of 
drug and food safety and is particularly challenged in the regulation of products based upon 
new science.”). 
 141. See e.g., Project Inform: Mission Statement, http://www.projectinform 
.org/about/mission.shtml (last visited Sept. 13, 2009) (“Project Inform . . . supports individu-
als to make informed choices about their HIV health . . . .”). 
 142. See Steve Usdin, FDA Reviewing Intellectual Bias, BIOCENTURY, Apr. 20, 2009, 
at A11, available at http://www.biocentury.com/BCApp/BioCentury 
Common/BCPublications.aspx?ss=1. 
 143. See EPSTEIN, OVERDOSE, supra note 19, at 137 (“The FDA deals only in averages, 
and the averages don’t predict the response of any one individual to either drug.” (quoting 
Steven Walker, Letter to the Editor, Iressa: The Reality vs. the FDA’s Version, WALL ST. J., 
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proach tends to deny licensing approvals to products that serve a fraction 
of the overall population, even if it is of no benefit to the rest. That appears 
to be the motivation for the FDA’s controversial decision to limit the use 
of Iressa to persons already on the drug.144  
The severity of these regulatory conflicts is revealed by the recent 
FDA decision to grant, over much opposition, Genentech an accelerated 
approval to promote and sell Avastin, its drug for breast cancer patients.145 
The FDA advisory committee voted five to four against the use of the 
drug,146 and if that recommendation had been followed, the 38,000 or so 
women eligible for treatment would have been denied all (on-label) use, 
with an obvious hit on Genentech’s share price.147 As shown, a single vote 
looms all too large in the regulatory system that faces sharp discontinuities 
in outcome no matter where or how it sets its decision point. The opposite 
is true in a decentralized system, where both sides register their best judg-
ment and allow downstream users to decide whether or not to use the 
treatment. In any decentralized setting, we can predict that a five to four 
vote against the use by a learned committee would on average result in 
fewer users than a five to four vote in favor. The numerical count will pro-
vide some information wholly apart from the knowledge of which panel 
members took which position. But that difference is likely to be small be-
cause there is no discontinuity at the fifty percent point.  
The problem is still more worrisome, for on the merits no one is really 
sure who is right. Evidence suggests that using Avastin in conjunction with 
Taxol, a well-established drug, delayed tumor progression for about 5.5 
months longer than the use of Taxol alone—a clear plus.148 By the same 
token, Avastin did not prolong life by any significant measure and had a 
higher rate of adverse side effects than when Taxol was used alone.149 The 
FDA’s inclination to question the use of Avastin is understandable because 
the objective measures do not stack up well in comparison trials. But so 
what? One reason why the principles of full disclosure and informed con-
sent have gained such traction is that they respect subjective preferences 
on questions concerning the quality of life.150 Within a decentralized sys-
tem, the downward push of information allows potential users to absorb it 
seamlessly. If physicians are “split” over the use of a drug such as Avastin, 
then patients’ decisions will likely follow that division. An administrative 
 
July 26, 2005, at A25)). 
 144. See id. at 135–38. 
 145. See Victoria Colliver, New Option for Breast Cancer Treatment, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 
23, 2008, at A1 (noting that approval was granted in the absence of any other treatment for 
metastatic breast cancer). 
 146. See FDA Panel Nixes Avastin for Breast Cancer, http://www. 
pharmalot.com/2007/12/fda-panel-nixes-avastin-for-breast-cancer (Dec. 5, 2007, 4:36PM 
EST) (noting that FDA medical reviewers found that the slower rate of tumor progression 
did not offset the increase in side effects). 
 147. See Heather Tomlinson, The FDA: Feared Throughout the Pharmaceutical Indus-
try, THE INDEPENDENT, Aug. 12, 2001, available at http://www 
.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/the-fda-feared-throughout-the-pharmaceutical-
industry-665420.html (discussing the negative impact of an FDA rejection on a drug compa-
ny’s share prices). 
 148. See Pollack, supra note 135 (reporting that women went a median of 11.3 months 
before their cancer worsened or they died when they used Avastin in combination with Tax-
ol, compared with 5.8 months if they just took Taxol). 
 149. See id. 
 150. See Schuck, supra note 29, at 924–25. 
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decision that converts a five to four vote against a drug into a legal regime 
that prohibits its use is illogical in close cases. And, again, note this abid-
ing asymmetry: a vote of five to four in favor does not require all to use the 
drug, but allows all patients to choose to use it. The distribution and inter-
pretation of information strongly favor a decentralized system that relies 
on persuasion. 
B. EXTERNAL INFLUENCES 
The process to decide whether the FDA should approve a drug does 
not take place in hermetic environment in which the science, and only the 
science, governs the ultimate outcome. By necessity there are always polit-
ical overtones that arise because of the identity of the permit applicant, its 
potential customers and competitors, all of whom have some access to the 
FDA and to the Congressional committees that oversee its actions. Com-
petitors, for example, stand to lose market share if a rival product is li-
censed for sale. The FDA is subject to constant political pressure, such as 
the nonstop, bipartisan attacks of influential figures Senator Charles Grass-
ley and Representative John Dingell, on the ineffective protection that the 
FDA renders to consumers.151 Other political actors are reluctant to attack 
Senator Grassley, whose support might be needed on other health care is-
sues, in this case Medicare reform.152  
On the economic side the stakes are also enormous. If a second drug 
in a given class enters the market then it undercuts the monopoly obtained 
by the first to enter. Even in a duopoly situation, unit prices often fall by 
thirty percent or more in markets where sales could amount of tens, even 
hundreds, of millions of dollars per year.153 Therefore, competitors often 
take steps to torpedo their rivals’ FDA applications. One recent example 
involves the FDA decision to delay approval, for more tests of course, of 
the cancer vaccine Provenge, which had shown promising results on cer-
tain classes of prostate cancers.154 The FDA decision was roundly attacked 
in thousands of letters by angry persons who thought that this vaccine held 
out some hope for patients.155 The account of the matter published in Na-
ture Biotechnology stated that approval delays for Provenge went against 
the advice of an advisory committee.156 The report further stated that Pro-
 
 151. See, e.g., Alicia Mundy, Dingell, Grassley Call for Overhaul of Agency ‘Culture’, 
WALL ST. J., July 30, 2008, at A4 (reporting that reforms proposed by Senator Grassley and 
Representative Dingell, aimed at increasing the FDA’s effectiveness, would give the FDA 
the power to levy fines, expanded power to order drug recalls, and the authority to impose 
additional limitations on drug advertisements); see also Press Release, Charles E. Grassley, 
Ranking Member, U.S. Senate Comm. on Fin., Grassley Asks for an Accounting of Contacts 
Between FDA and Device Maker (Mar. 6, 2009), available at http:// 
finance.senate.gov/press/Gpress/2009/prg030609d.pdf (noting what Grassley deems “a ‘too 
cozy relationship’ between the FDA and industry”). 
 152. See Usdin, supra note 108, at A2. 
 153. LUIS M. B. CABRAL, INTRODUCTION TO INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 112 (2000) 
(noting that duopoly prices are lower then monopoly prices). 
 154. See Editorial, The Regulator Disapproves, NATURE BIOTECH., Jan. 2008, at 1, 1 
(discussing the FDA’s decision to delay approval of the cancer vaccine Provenge, calling it a 
“knee-jerk defensive response to accusations of process impropriety”). 
 155. See id. 
 156. See id. Advisory committees are composed of experts in a given field to advise the 
FDA on whether and how to approve certain types of drugs. See U.S. Food & Drug Admin-
istration, Advisory Committees, http://www.fda.gov/ 
AdvisoryCommittees/default.htm (last visited Sept. 13, 2009) (discussing the composition of 
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venge’s denial was triggered by a critical letter from Howard Scher, a doc-
tor in the Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center, who had an undis-
closed financial and fiduciary interest in a rival drug Asentar.157 
Conflict of interest regulations require routine disclosure of these 
connections, thereby allowing public authorities to discount these claims, 
if they so chose. Nonetheless questions of undue influence still remain. 
Unfortunately permititis makes the entire information system more vulner-
able to subversion than the NCCN and similar voluntary organizations, 
where a few powerful individuals or institutions are not in a position to 
subvert new or experimental drugs. Improper evidence could, of course, 
mislead NCCN members. Any potential harm is cabined because voluntary 
organizations cannot issue bans and other information can surface to coun-
teract previously misleading facts. Yet this key fact remains: the redundan-
cy of a decentralized information system offsets its failings and makes it 
resistant to political maneuvers that are inherent when government offi-
cials exercise the permit power. 
CONCLUSION   
This article is a conscious outlier from other treatments on the vexed 
topic of FDA power. In it, I do not ask how the FDA should exercise its 
permit powers; instead I focus on the prior question of whether the FDA 
should have those powers at all. My analysis is not meant to be ad hoc or 
personal. Rather, it starts from a general political theory which maintains a 
strong presumption against the use of the permit power to regulate auto-
nomous individuals. It then examines FDA activities to identify some suf-
ficient reason to overcome that presumption. The search is futile. The 
standard justification for the use of state power, namely the protection 
against the risk of force or fraud, plays little if any role.  
Nor does it appear that the FDA can engage in some well-calibrated 
campaign of consumer protection against the hasty and unwise choices that 
people undoubtedly make in their own lives. To be sure, it would be foo-
lish to dismiss this risk on the ground that all individuals are imbued with a 
natural talent to make only rational choices. They aren’t. But it takes more 
than this showing to justify the FDA’s expansive permit power. First, the 
mode of distribution of drugs matters. Greater concern exists about impul-
sive, habitual, or otherwise foolish behavior when individuals have direct 
access to certain drugs. Even here we should be highly cautious about 
bans, even while entertaining the possibility. Cancer drugs are always dis-
tributed through professional intermediaries with ready access to scientific 
and technical information. These intermediate organizations play an exten-
sive role right now, even as the FDA exercises its strong gatekeeper func-
tion. Allowing one on-label use does not decide whether a drug should be 
used, or whether that use should be alone or in conjunction with other 
drugs. It does not decide whether that drug should be used as a first-line or 
second-line treatment. Nor does it even hint at the structure of the gray 
market culture of off-label uses. 
The key conclusion is that voluntary current mechanisms for both on-
label and off-label uses are far more likely to work across the board. In this 
arena, two systems of control are not better than one. Rather, public in-
 
FDA advisory committees).  
 157. See The Regulator Disapproves, supra note 154, at 1. 
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vestments in the FDA’s permit power will likely yield a negative return. 
Decentralized bodies are more likely to make sounder decisions. As infor-
mation is collated and presented, slow shifts in uses and behaviors under a 
legal regime that facilitates continuous updating and experimentation 
should be expected. Even if the FDA obtains additional resources, it could 
not discharge its chosen mission. At any resource level, the FDA is a 
second best relative to the current private systems and these systems could 
be improved further if drug companies were allowed to participate in the 
dissemination of information generated by independent sources. Right 
now, the prospects for incremental FDA reforms are unlikely. No matter 
how Congress tinkers with the present framework, the FDA would still use 
control over the processes that systematically underestimate the risks of 
delay, would ignore variation across individual cases, and would be vul-
nerable to enormous political and economic pressures. The FDA’s permit 
power is an open wound in the body politic. Permititis cannot be con-
trolled; it should be eliminated. 
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